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Foreword 
 
In September 2010, our five organisations jointly published Common Cause: The 
Case for Working with our Cultural Values. This report made the case that 
systemic and durable responses to the challenges that our organisations 
confront cannot be envisaged unless these come to be built upon an appeal to 
intrinsic values.  
 
While Common Cause highlighted extensive empirical evidence from social 
psychology that intrinsic values are there to be engaged in us all, we wanted to 
demonstrate that this was the case through work with UK citizens discussing 
‘bigger-than-self’ problems that are of importance to our respective 
organisations: climate change, the loss of the British countryside, child mortality 
in developing countries, and domestic child impoverishment. Communicating 
Bigger-than-self Problems to Extrinsically-oriented Audiences presents the 
results of such a study. 
 
We demonstrate that a simple process of asking people for whom extrinsic 
values are of particular significance to reflect on the importance that they attach 
to intrinsic values can lead to marked changes in the way that these people 
subsequently talk about bigger-than-self problems. For example, once their 
intrinsic values are engaged in this way, people who are normally more 
extrinsically-oriented are more likely to voice concerns about equality and 
justice, the moral imperative to address bigger-than-self problems, or to express 
a feeling of responsibility to others. Conversely, these people are less likely to 
invoke self-interest or financial concerns.   
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These results, therefore, further underscore the possibility of communicating 
and campaigning in ways which – though tailored to particular audience 
segments – nonetheless aim to engage intrinsic values: values which are known 
to be of crucial importance in motivating sustained expressions of concern about 
social and environmental challenges. As such, this study points to new and 
exciting approaches to the design of campaigns and communications. We now 
invite others – academics, third sector communicators, and agency employees 
alike – to help us as we further develop and test such approaches. 
 
 
 
Martin Kirk 
Head of UK Campaigns 
Oxfam 
 
George Marshall 
Director of Projects 
Climate Outreach and Information Network (COIN) 
 
David Norman 
Director of Campaigns 
WWF-UK 
 
Neil Sinden 
Director of Policy and Campaigns 
CPRE 
 
Adeela Warley 
Head of Communications 
Friends of the Earth 
 
 
 
This work was supported by COIN, CPRE, Friends of the Earth, Oxfam and WWF-
UK as part of the Common Cause initiative. Whether you are an academic, a 
practitioner, or a student, we would welcome your involvement in Common 
Cause. For more information, please visit valuesandframes.org, or contact us at 
info@valuesandframes.org. 
5 
Summary and Practitioners’ Guide 
 
This report presents an overview of the results of research conducted with a 
pool of volunteers from Cardiff, Wales, for whom extrinsic (or more 
materialistic) values were held to be particularly important by comparison to the 
UK population at large. This research focused on the effects of asking 
participants in the study to reflect for a few minutes on why either intrinsic 
values (‘acceptance’, ‘affiliation’ or ‘being broadminded’) were of importance to 
them, or – in the case of a second group of participants - why extrinsic values 
(‘popularity’, ‘preserving public image’ or ‘wealth’) were important to them. 
Participants were then interviewed about a range of ‘bigger-than-self’ problems 
(including, for example, climate change and child poverty in the UK). These 
interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed. 
 
Although all the participants in the study had been selected because they held 
extrinsic values to be more important, we found marked differences between, on 
the one hand, the way in which participants who had been asked to reflect upon 
extrinsic values spoke about bigger-than-self problems, and, on the other, the 
way in which participants who had been asked to reflect upon intrinsic values 
spoke about these problems. Compared to those primed with extrinsic values, 
participants primed with intrinsic values spoke about social and environmental 
challenges in ways that conveyed a stronger sense of moral duty, and a greater 
obligation to act to help meet these challenges. 
 
These results should not be taken to suggest that asking participants to reflect 
on why particular values are of importance to them leads to a long-term, or 
‘dispositional’, change in the values that these participants hold to be important. 
Our initial survey of participants’ values provided a basis for us to select 
participants who all placed relatively high dispositional importance on extrinsic 
values. Such a disposition would have arisen as a result of accumulated 
experience, probably over many years, and is unlikely to be changed in a durable 
way as a result of briefly priming other values. 
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Rather, it seems that the differences we have identified between participants 
primed with intrinsic values and those primed with extrinsic values arose as a 
result of ‘engaging’ existing values – i.e., of turning certain values ‘on’ in people’s 
minds, such that these values influenced how the participants conceived of the 
social and environmental challenges about which they were interviewed.  
 
Clearly, individuals differ, dispositionally, in the values to which they attach 
particular importance. Unfortunately, however, this is sometimes taken to imply 
that it is futile to communicate with people who place particular dispositional 
importance on extrinsic values by appealing to intrinsic values. In fact, the 
results that we present here lend further support to the perspective that people 
hold a wide range of values, and that these can each be engaged.  
 
Our results, then, have important implications for the design of third-sector 
campaigns and communications: in particular, the language and ‘frames’ that are 
used in such campaigns and communications.  
 
Our key recommendations for campaigners and communicators are as follows: 
 
- Audiences who hold extrinsic values to be more important, at a 
dispositional level, can nonetheless be engaged in ways that lead 
them to express concerns consistent with intrinsic values. The 
assertion, made by some campaign consultants and communication 
agencies, that it is futile to engage people who attach relatively greater 
importance to extrinsic values, using frames that embody intrinsic values, 
is not supported by the results of this research. 
 
- Activating intrinsic values leads an audience to express greater 
concern about ‘bigger-than-self’ problems. Although it is not 
something that we tested in this study, there is extensive evidence – from 
a very large number of other studies – that intrinsic values also underpin 
greater motivation to behave in line with concern about such problems. 
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- Activating intrinsic values leads to greater expressions of 
concern across a wide range of ‘bigger-than-self’ problems. It is 
not necessary to engage values specifically associated with particular 
‘bigger-than-self’ problems in order to generate heightened expressions of 
concern. Asking participants to think about why ‘acceptance’, ‘affiliation’ 
or ‘being broadminded’ was important to them led to heightened 
expressions of concern about a range of ‘bigger-than-self’ problems, and 
stronger perception of an obligation to act to help address these 
problems. Such results provide further evidence that any communicator – 
whatever the issues about which he or she is concerned – who engages 
intrinsic values in the course of interacting with his or her audience, is 
likely to increase this audience’s motivation to express concern about a 
range of ‘bigger-than-self’ problems. 
 
- On the whole, campaigns and communications that serve – 
explicitly or otherwise – to prompt an audience to reflect on the 
importance that they attach to intrinsic values are likely to be 
more successful in prompting systemic concern about ‘bigger-
than-self’ problems.  There is an important opportunity here for 
creative communicators and campaigners to develop approaches that 
prompt such reflection. Some of the third sector organisations that 
supported the present research are now beginning to work with 
communication agencies to develop such approaches.  
 
- These results invite careful reflection on the criteria used in 
audience segmentation techniques. While we absolutely agree with 
the need to tailor a message to the intended audience, we have been 
highly critical of approaches which, following value surveys, have 
appealed to those audience segments who place greater relative 
importance on extrinsic values by framing communications and 
campaigns to appeal to these values. Nonetheless, values-orientation may 
of course be important as a basis for segmentation prior to engaging 
intrinsic values. But it may also be the case that other criteria, besides 
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values-orientation, are of far greater importance for the purposes of 
audience segmentation. For example, issues of national identity, regional 
language differences, educational attainment, or shared interests may 
provide a more relevant basis for choosing between possible frames to 
use in a particular campaign than values-orientation. 
 
- These results probably provide insights on what linguistic 
‘frames’ are likely to engage intrinsic values. Frames are used not 
just to express what is understood, but also to understand what is 
expressed. In light of this, presenting an audience with the frames that 
comparable individuals are found to consistently use when primed with 
intrinsic values holds promise for engaging these values. Elsewhere, we 
have advanced a detailed argument for the engagement and 
strengthening of intrinsic values as a basis for tackling ‘bigger-than-self’ 
problems (see valuesandframes.org). As we’ve seen, one response to the 
present study is to begin to develop communications and campaigns that 
prompt an audience to reflect on the importance that they attach to 
intrinsic values. But another is to use frames which, while more passively 
received, may nonetheless help to engage intrinsic values.  
 
The research that we describe here, and the implications that we draw from this, 
focuses on language. However, it is important to note that this should not be 
seen to diminish the importance of other crucial aspects of people’s lived 
experience when thinking about how third sector organisations communicate and 
campaign. A person’s response to ‘bigger-than-self’ problems is likely to be 
shaped by many aspects of her cumulative experience – in both a short-term and 
a more dispositional way. Such responses are likely to be influenced, for 
example, by her educational experience, her experience at the work-place, and 
her experience of social institutions and public policies – to name just a few. 
While language may be one of the easier things for campaigners and 
communicators to change, it is not necessarily the most important.  
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Abbreviations and Glossary 
 
Bigger-than-self problems These are problems such as climate change, 
or child impoverishment in the UK – i.e., 
problems that will be difficult to address 
through reliance upon expressions of self-
interest. The ‘return’ (in cost-benefit terms) 
on an individual’s personal effort to help 
address a bigger-than-self problem is unlikely 
to justify this expenditure of effort in helping 
to tackle the problem. 
 
Cognitive frames Our language is linked to the way that we 
think – as a result of our experience of the 
world and how we conceptualise it.  In turn, 
our experience and conceptualisations are 
stored in structured forms in our long-term 
memory. These are called cognitive frames.  
 
Priming The process of temporarily engaging a 
particular idea or motivation in a person’s 
mind.  
 
Extrinsic values  Extrinsic values include those for conformity, 
image, social recognition, popularity, 
preservation of one’s public image, wealth, 
financial success and authority. Throughout 
this report, we use ‘extrinsic values’ to denote 
both ‘extrinsic goals’ and ‘self-enhancement 
values’ – two discrete but related concepts in 
the social psychology literature. 
 
Intrinsic values Intrinsic values include those for self-
acceptance, broadmindedness, affiliation, 
community feeling and social justice. 
Throughout this report, we use ‘intrinsic 
values’ to denote both ‘intrinsic goals’ and 
‘self-transcendence values’ – two discrete 
but related concepts in the social psychology 
literature. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Responses to bigger-than-self problems such as climate change, global poverty, 
child deprivation or loss of the British countryside currently fall far short of the 
breadth and depth of response necessary if these are to be adequately 
addressed. 
 
A large and robust body of evidence from social psychology highlights the 
importance of cultural values in shaping our collective responses to challenges 
such as these. Extrinsic values (those which focus on social recognition and 
power, wealth, authority and preservation of one’s public image) are associated 
with lower levels of concern about such problems and lower commitment to 
addressing them. Intrinsic values (including understanding, appreciation and 
tolerance for other people, unity with nature, concern about equality) are on the 
other hand associated with higher levels of concern about a wide range of bigger-
than-self problems, and greater motivation to adopt behaviours in line such 
concern. 
  
So, for example, people who prioritise intrinsic values are more likely to pursue 
various forms of civic engagement, to express concern about social justice, to 
engage in environmentally friendly behaviours, and to express lower levels of 
prejudice towards groups with which they do not themselves identify. In 
contrast, placing more importance on extrinsic values is generally associated 
with higher levels of prejudice, less concern about the environment, lower 
motivation to engage in environmentally-friendly behaviour, weak concern about 
human rights, more manipulative behaviour and less willingness to help others.1  
 
This body of evidence raises numerous important questions but in particular 
prompts careful reflection on the social influences that shape dominant cultural 
values. There are many such influences, including public policy, media, decision-
making structures, and the form of social institutions. This study focuses on just 
                                                     
1 See Holmes et al. (2011) for a summary of this evidence base. 
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one source of influence: the language that is used in public discourse when 
discussing social and environmental challenges. Although language is only one of 
many sources of influence it is important for at least two reasons. Firstly, it is 
particularly easy to change (unlike, for example, the way in which public 
institutions operate). Secondly, it is a source of influence that is particularly 
relevant to organisations – such as third-sector organisations – which invest 
considerable resources in communicating with public audiences.  
 
Values are implicit in the way in which a communication is ‘framed’. The 
language and metaphors that a communication deploys communicate a certain 
view of the world, and particular values will usually be integral to that view. 
Consequently, communications – whether produced by business, government, or 
non-governmental organisations – inescapably engage particular values, and the 
repeated engagement of particular values is likely to lead an audience to hold 
these values more strongly.2 
 
Intrinsic values, then, are likely to be strengthened by communications that are 
framed in ways that create the impression that these values are desirable or that 
they reflect social norms. On the other hand, extrinsic values – which undermine 
people’s motivation to address social and environmental problems – are likely to 
be strengthened by communications which are framed in ways that create the 
impression that these values are desirable or reflect social norms.  
 
                                                     
2 This perspective has been disputed by some campaign consultants (though not, so far 
as we are aware, by research psychologists). Both Rose (2010) and Dade (undated) 
have argued that pursuit of behaviour in line with a particular value is likely to diminish 
the importance that a person attaches to this value. The authors of the present report, 
and of other recent reports, have argued that there is no theoretical or empirical 
evidence for this perspective (Crompton, 2010; Crompton & Kasser, 2009; Darton & Kirk, 
2011; Holmes et al., 2011), and neither Rose nor Dade have produced any such evidence. 
Indeed, a recent survey of social psychologists with expertise in behaviour, motivation 
and values, conducted by two of the authors of this report, failed to find an academic 
who agreed with the viewpoint advanced by Rose and Dade (Kasser & Crompton, 2011).   
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Of course, many campaigns are framed in ways that appeal to extrinsic values – 
they may highlight the economic self-interest of a particular developed country 
to assist in the development of poorer countries (because this could help to 
establish new export markets), or they may appeal to the economic 
competitiveness advantages of being a ‘first mover’ in investment in new green 
technologies (renewables, for example).  Analogous appeals are used to attempt 
to motivate private-sphere behavioural choices. So, for example, many pro-
environmental behaviours are promoted on the grounds that these save money or 
increase social status. 
 
It is quite possible that campaigns framed in ways that appeal to extrinsic 
values could have a net negative impact, because such campaigns will probably 
serve to strengthen extrinsic values, thus outweighing the benefits that these 
campaigns may have in encouraging some people to adopt a particular socially – 
or environmentally – friendly behaviour, to donate to a charity, or to lend their 
support to a campaign. Such a possibility is particularly likely because, for every 
individual who is exposed to a campaign framed in terms of extrinsic values and 
who decides, as a result, to act in line with the campaign goals, there will be a 
large number of other people who will see the campaign material but will not be 
moved to act. Nonetheless, these people, too, are likely to have been influenced 
by the campaign materials in a way that increases their concern for extrinsic 
values, and therefore reduces their concern about social and environmental 
issues.3  
 
Yet it has been argued by some campaign consultants that it is futile to 
communicate with people who attach particular importance to extrinsic values 
through the use of frames that embody intrinsic values.4  
 
We have argued that this is not the case. Evidence accumulated across a large 
number of cultures shows that intrinsic values are held to be important, even 
among those people who attach particular importance to extrinsic values. It 
                                                     
3 For further reflection on this point, see Kasser & Crompton (2011) 
4 Dade (undated); Rose (2010) 
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seems that everyone holds the full range of values to be important at different 
times, and even those people who attach particular importance to extrinsic 
values in a more consistent way still hold intrinsic values to be important.5  
 
Moreover, the priority that people accord to particular values in the short-term, 
and indeed their more durable – or ‘dispositional’ – commitment to particular 
values, changes over time. In the short-term, even over the course of a day, a 
wide range of different values may be engaged. The values that are engaged 
while at the supermarket are likely to be different to those values engaged while 
sitting around the dinner table with one’s family. But people’s values are also 
known to change at a dispositional level over longer periods of time.6  
 
So we are critical of communication and campaign strategies that apportion 
people to particular values ‘modes’, and that then advocate engaging these 
audience segments through appeal to these ‘modes’ – irrespective of whether 
these are values that are socially and environmentally helpful.  
 
Nonetheless, audience segmentation approaches of the type that we criticize do 
convey at least one important insight, assimilated from commercial marketing 
campaigns: not all audiences are the same, and it is important to communicate 
with different audiences in ways that respond to these differences.  
 
So we are now led to two important conclusions: 
 
1. It is important to tailor communications and campaigns in awareness of 
the audience at which these are targeted. 
 
2. It is important to communicate in ways that successfully avoid engaging 
(and therefore strengthening) extrinsic values, because these oppose the 
emergence of greater social and environmental concern about bigger-
than-self problems.  
 
                                                     
5 Schwartz (1992) 
6 Bardi (2009) 
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The research described in this paper sets about exploring these two conclusions.  
In developing this exploration, two questions are posed: 
 
1. Can we demonstrate the possibility of engaging intrinsic values among 
audiences who attach greater than average importance to extrinsic 
values, in such a way that the engagement of these intrinsic values is 
recognisable when these people are subsequently asked to talk about 
bigger-than-self problems such as climate change or child mortality in 
developing countries? 
 
2. Can we begin to identify particular cognitive frames that audiences who 
attach greater than average importance to extrinsic values themselves 
use, in talking about bigger-than-self problems, when they have 
undergone a process to engage intrinsic values? If we can, then it may be 
that in future communications about these problems, such frames will 
help to engage intrinsic values in new audiences who attach greater than 
average importance to extrinsic values. 
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2. Method 
2.1. Brief overview 
In the first phase of this study, we screened a large pool of volunteers for 
individuals who attached the greatest importance to extrinsic values. We then 
split these individuals into two groups. We ‘primed’ one group with intrinsic 
values, and the other group with extrinsic values, following a standard procedure 
used in other published experiments of this type. This ‘priming’ process leads to 
an engagement of either intrinsic or extrinsic values in participants’ minds. We 
then interviewed each of these participants about climate change, the loss of the 
British countryside, child mortality in developing countries and child 
impoverishment in the UK.  We transcribed audio recordings of these interviews – 
which lasted up to an hour, and then analysed these transcripts employing both a 
computer programme, and an expert analyst. The discourse analyst who 
conducted this analysis (Professor Paul Chilton) was ‘naïve’ both to the specific 
prime that each participant had been given, and even to the type of priming 
conditions that we had used. (In other words, when he was presented with the 
transcript of each interview, he had no way of knowing the priming condition to 
which each participant had been exposed.)  
 
We then looked for statistically significant differences between the cognitive 
frames used by participants to talk about each of the ‘bigger than self’ problems, 
depending upon whether we had primed them with extrinsic or intrinsic values.  
Each of the steps in this experimental procedure is outlined in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of stages in this study 
Large pool of participants
Screened for people who hold extrinsic values
to be relatively more important
Split into two groups. 
One group primed with extrinsic values, the other with intrinsic values
Participants interviewed about social and environmental issues.
Discourse analysis on interview transcripts.
Frames found 
to be 
 different?
Extrinsically-oriented
Extrinsic
prime
Intrinsic
prime
18 
In the second phase of this study, further in-depth discourse analysis was 
conducted on a subset of participants drawn from both priming conditions.  At 
this stage, however, analyst was no longer naïve to the priming condition used 
with each participant, and thus might have been biased in certain ways.  
 
Readers who are not concerned with the background details of this methodology 
can now skip to Section 3. The remainder of this section outlines the 
methodology of our study in a little more depth. For an even more in-depth 
account of this methodology, readers are referred to a comprehensive research 
report, to be published separately.  
2.2. Selecting participants for the study 
We wanted to work with audience segments who attach greater than average 
importance to extrinsic values. With this in mind, we conducted a pre-screen on a 
large pool of volunteers to identify those who were in the top 10% in attaching 
importance to extrinsic values.  
 
Participants in this study were initially recruited via an e-mail invitation to take 
part in a brief survey.  774 participants responded to this e-mail, including 536 
from a Cardiff University pool, and 238 from a community participant panel.  
 
Participants were asked to rank a range of values in terms of their importance as 
guiding principles in their lives. These values were a subset of those measured in 
the Schwartz Value Survey, including five self-enhancement values (being 
ambitious, being successful, possessing wealth, social power, and authority), 
four self-transcendent values (equality, being helpful, unity with nature, and a 
world at peace), three openness values (a varied life, being curious, freedom), 
one conservation value (respect for tradition), and one hedonism value 
(pleasure). Because we were primarily interested in finding individuals who 
placed a high priority on self-enhancement values, the measure contained a 
larger proportion of these values than the others. 
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We rank-ordered participants’ scores on extrinsic values from highest to lowest, 
and identified the participants whose mean extrinsic scores placed them in the 
top 10 percent of the sample (there were 77 of these participants). We invited 
these individuals via email to participate in a second study, for which we provided 
a small financial incentive. Our final sample of 30 participants included 17 
women and 13 men, with an average age of 41. 
 
Although our participants were all drawn from the top 10% of this large pool of 
people, ranked according to the importance that they attached to extrinsic 
values, we still wanted to check that these people were significantly oriented to 
extrinsic values by comparison to the population at large. To assess this, we 
compared our participants’ scores with data on UK values collected by the 
European Social Survey.7 We found that our participants did indeed demonstrate 
a significantly stronger attachment to extrinsic values than the UK-wide sample. 
However, our participants were not significantly less intrinsically-orientated 
than the UK average although the trend was in the direction that would be 
predicted from Schwartz’s circular model of values (i.e., an increase in extrinsic 
values did indeed predict a decrease in intrinsic values). 
2.3. Priming and interviews 
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually and underwent the priming 
manipulation.  This procedure entailed randomly assigning participants to 
complete a task in which they reflected carefully on either extrinsic or intrinsic 
values: participants were asked to spend 10 minutes writing reasons for 
considering three values to be important.8 Half were assigned to write about 
three extrinsic values, the other half to write about intrinsic values. The values 
selected for the extrinsic prime were popularity, preserving public image, and 
wealth; the values for the intrinsic prime condition were acceptance, affiliation, 
and being broadminded. It is important to note that the values used in the 
intrinsic prime condition did not relate directly to humanitarian or environmental 
concerns. We expected that engagement of these values would nonetheless 
                                                     
7 ESS (2002).  
8 This procedure was based on Maio et al. (2001). 
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affect how people talked about humanitarian and ecological topics, given the 
large body of research demonstrating a type of ‘bleed-over’ between compatible 
values, such that engaging one type of intrinsic value is likely to engage other 
values in the intrinsic group. An example of the priming process is shown in 
Figure 2. This has been transcribed from longhand, to preserve the anonymity of 
the participant.  
Figure 2: An example of one participant’s response to the priming questions. 
 
Below are some values. In the space provided next to the values, please write 
down reasons why you think the value in question is important. 
 
Why do you think acceptance is important? 
 
Acceptance is important to improve self-confidence and 
to receive gratification of what you are doing as a 
person is right.  
 
It is also very important to be accepted if you are 
‘different’ i.e. have a disability, in order to become 
an equal part of society. 
 
Why do you think affiliation is important? 
 
Affiliation is important to create a sense of community 
and be around people who have similar interests and/or 
beliefs as you. 
 
Why do you think being broadminded is important? 
 
It is important to be broadminded in order to gain a 
fuller, more rounded experience of life. 
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Immediately following the priming procedure, participants began a semi-
structured interview, which was conducted in two stages. Although, in 
interviewing participants, the interviewer was not naïve to priming condition, this 
was not considered significant in the light of the use of a standardised 
participant-led approach to conducting the interviews. In each stage, 
participants were asked questions about four topics in the following order:  
climate change, the loss of British countryside, child mortality in developing 
countries, and child impoverishment in the UK.  In the first stage, participants 
answered three questions about each topic. For example, in the case of the 
climate change topic, they were asked: 
 
• What are your general thoughts about climate change? 
• What are some of the reasons why climate change is either 
important or unimportant? 
• Emotionally speaking, how does climate change make you feel? 
 
After answering comparable questions about the three other topics, the second 
stage of the interview commenced, during which two more questions were asked 
about each topic, in order.  Below are the two questions, again worded for the 
topic of climate change: 
 
• What actions, if any, do you think that you should take to help with 
climate change? 
• What other actions, if any, should Government, businesses, and 
communities take to help with climate change? 
 
 
Following the interview, participants completed a personal value questionnaire9 
to check whether participants’ values had changed as a result of the priming 
manipulation. Participants were asked to read brief paragraphs describing a 
person’s behaviour, and, for each paragraph, rate how similar they were to the 
person, using a 6-point scale from 1 (very much like me) to 6 (not like me at all). 
Each paragraph was relevant to one of the core values described by Schwartz.10  
                                                     
9 Schwartz et al. (2001) 
10 Schwartz (1992) 
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For instance, the value of creativity was described as follows: “Thinking up new 
ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own 
original way.”  
2.4 Linguistic analysis 
Audio recordings of the interviews were transcribed and analysed using a 
computer program. We used five variables based on semantic categories in a 
computer program called Wmatrix: helping words (e.g. help, support, aid); words 
concerning distance (e.g., near, far), emotional actions, states & processes (e.g. 
love, worried, appalled); 1st person singular pronouns (I, me, my, mine, myself) 
and 1st person plural pronouns (we, us, our, ours, ourselves); and deontic words 
(that is, words relating to duty or obligation) (e.g., should, ought, duty to).  The 
computer program calculates the relative frequencies of each of these word 
categories for each transcript, providing the relative frequencies of each 
semantic category for each participant.   
 
Separately from this computerized approach interviews were also analysed by 
an experienced linguist (Paul Chilton). It should be reiterated that, in Phase 1 
of this analysis the linguist was naive both to the nature of the priming 
process, and to the priming condition to which each participant 
belonged.  For each of the four topics, Chilton focused on five variables: value 
orientation, immediacy, scope of moral duty, action obligations, and emotional 
intensity.  Table 1 provides definitions and the basic scoring template for each of 
these variables. 
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Variable Definition Scoring 
Value Orientation Extent to which extrinsic vs. 
intrinsic values express 
themselves when participants 
discuss the topics. 
1 - predominantly extrinsic  
2 - mixed/analyst uncertain  
3 - predominantly intrinsic 
Action Obligation Extent to which participants 
believe there is an obligation 
to act to solve the problem. 
1- no one should act (help) 
2- uncertain/unclear/absence of 
strong obligation/self has no need or 
duty to act  
3 - self/individuals/other agency 
should act  
Scope of Moral Duty  
 
The particular people or things 
towards whom or towards 
which participants expressed 
moral duty; this could range 
from self, to close family, to 
kin, to compatriots, to all 
humans, to all life. 
1 - self interests/vague we or 
you/none 
2 - home/UK/mixed focus 
3 - global human/animal/environment 
interests 
 
Expressed Emotional 
Intensity 
Presence of strong emotions 
when participants discuss the 
topic. 
1 - low level 
2 - moderate/non-committal  
3 - high level 
Immediacy How much the participants 
feel the topic is close in time 
and space to them. 
1 - distant/low impact/salience/no 
2 - moderate/unclear/no concern 
3 - close/high impact/salience 
Table 1 – Overview of linguist’s qualitative ratings from the interviews 
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In Phase 2 the linguist conducted further analysis on a subset of the 
interview transcripts. We chose 14 participants for further analysis: 7 
participants from the group primed with intrinsic values and 7 participants from 
the group primed with extrinsic values. These individuals where chosen on the 
basis that they appeared to have responded most strongly to the priming 
procedure across a variety of variables, and on topics for which we found 
significant or close-to-significant effects. 11 
 
Transcripts from interviews with these 14 participants were subjected to 
detailed linguistic analysis. Phase 2 generated results that are of great 
importance, but – because the analyst was aware of the priming condition in 
analyzing them at this stage – they are very different from those generated in 
Phase 1. Further, it is of course possible that bias may have entered the analysis 
during this second phase, and so the results may need to be treated with greater 
caution. For this reason, examples of such analysis are reported in a separate 
section (Section 5). 
                                                     
11 These individuals were chosen as follows: we examined the effects of the priming 
conditions on each of the five variables listed in Table 1, for each of the interview topics. 
For example, we examined the effect of the prime for each participant’s expression of 
moral duty in talking about loss of the British countryside. In seven cases, these effects 
were significant or marginally significant. We then looked at the scores (1-3) that the 
analyst had awarded each participant, for each of these seven variable/topic 
combinations. We summed these scores for each participant, which could theoretically 
vary in the range 7-21.  We then selected the seven participants with the highest scores, 
and the seven with the lowest.  
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3. Results of Phase 1 
 
In this section we report on the results of this study at two levels: 
 
1. Computer analysis of the interview transcripts  
2. Analysis by a discourse analyst (while still naïve to primes) 
 
Results for these stages are presented in subsections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.  
3.1. Computer analysis 
In the first instance, it was thought useful to adopt a computerized analysis. We 
used the software tool Wmatrix, because it is designed to categorise word 
meanings. We wanted to see if Wmatrix detected differences between the types 
of words used by participants depending upon whether they had been primed 
with extrinsic or intrinsic values. We found no statistically significant 
differences, for the two priming conditions, in the relative frequency of words 
belonging to four of the five semantic categories that Wmatrix looked at 
(namely, deontic words, helping words, distance words, emotional words). This 
may be because interviewees were all talking about the same topics and 
responding to the same questions. It is likely that a more fine-grained analysis is 
required than the computerized word-counting can provide. However, the use of 
first-person pronouns did differ significantly. Participants primed with extrinsic 
values used significantly fewer 1st person singular pronouns (I, me, my, mine 
myself) than did participants primed with intrinsic values.  Differences in the use 
of the 1st person plural pronouns (we, us, our, ours, ourselves) approached 
significance, such that participants in the extrinsic-prime condition used fewer 
1st person plural pronouns than those in the intrinsic-prime condition. We 
comment further on these results in Section 4.1 
 
The difficulty of identifying effects using computer programs is a well-known 
problem in linguistic analysis. After all, people using the same set of words might 
combine them in different ways, producing entirely different meanings and 
attitudes.  By contrast, a human analyst is able to identify points at which, for 
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example, moral frames are used, even though no – or very few – deontic words 
are spoken. For this reason, the subsequent analysis by a discourse analyst 
(naïve to priming condition) was considered essential.  
3.2. Initial analysis by discourse analyst 
For each of Chilton’s non-computerised ratings described in Table 1 (i.e., Value 
Orientation, Action Obligation, Scope of Moral Duty, Expressed Emotional 
Intensity, and Immediacy), we conducted a statistical analysis to examine:  
 
1. Whether the rating varied depending on the type of values that had 
been primed (i.e., intrinsic or extrinsic values) 
2. Whether the rating varied depending on the topic participants were 
discussing (i.e., climate change, loss of British countryside, child 
mortality in developing countries, and child impoverishment in the UK) 
3. Whether these two factors interacted (i.e., whether the prime had an 
effect for certain topics, but not others). 
 
Results of these three statistical analyses are presented in the following sub-
sections, for each of the quantitative ratings listed in Table 1. These results are 
summarised in Table 2. Again, remember that, although the analysis itself has an 
important subjective component, at this stage the analyst did not know which 
priming condition each of the participants had undergone.  
 
3.2.1 Value Orientation 
The analyst scored each participant on a scale of 1 to 3, where 1 was 
predominantly extrinsically-oriented, 2 was mixed or unclear, and 3 was 
predominantly intrinsically-oriented (see Table 1). This score was awarded for 
each of the four topics (climate change, the loss of the British countryside, child 
mortality in developing countries and child impoverishment in the UK). Statistical 
analysis revealed a significant effect of the priming condition such that 
participants expressed a greater orientation towards intrinsic values in the 
intrinsic-prime condition than in the extrinsic-prime condition.   
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We did not find any significant effect arising from the topic discussed. Nor did we 
find any significant interaction between the topic and the priming condition.  
 
3.2.2 Action Obligation 
Next, we tested the extent to which participants expressed the belief that there 
was an obligation for some person or agency to act to address the topics about 
which they were interviewed. Transcripts were scored as outlined in Table 1. 
Again, we found that the priming condition had a significant effect. Participants 
primed with intrinsic values expressed higher Action Obligation than did those 
primed with extrinsic values.  Action Obligation also differed depending on the 
topic. Loss of British countryside elicited significantly lower action obligation 
than climate change. The interaction between prime and the topic was not 
significant, however. 
 
3.2.3 Scope of Moral Duty 
To whom or to what might participants feel they had an obligation? It might be 
to the self, the national community or to humans in general.  Analysis examining 
how far participants’ expression of moral duty extended beyond duty to self 
again revealed a significant effect of the priming condition. Participants primed 
with intrinsic values reflected a less self-interested and more universalistic 
concern for others than did those primed with extrinsic values.  Scope of Moral 
Duty was found to vary with topic, however. Specifically, loss of British 
countryside evoked significantly lower reference to moral duty than did the 
topics of climate change, child mortality in developing countries, or child 
impoverishment in the UK. There were no significant differences among these 
latter three topics.  The interaction between topic and priming condition was not 
significant. 
 
3.2.4 Immediacy 
It might have been the case that the different topics felt more salient, or 
‘closer’, to some participants, and less so for others. Although the trend was 
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found to be in the expected direction (for example, CIUK was found to be more 
immediate than CMDC or protecting the British countryside), this was just short 
of significance.  
  
3.2.5 Expressed Emotional Intensity 
Analysis of variance in emotional intensity revealed no significant effect of the 
priming condition, but there was a significant effect of topic. The topic of child 
mortality evoked significantly more emotion than the topic of climate change or 
loss of British countryside. No other effects were significant. 
 
Variable 
 
Analyst’s rating varies 
significantly with priming 
condition? 
Topic-specific effect? 
Value Orientation Yes: significantly higher  intrinsic 
orientation in participants primed 
for intrinsic values. 
No 
Action Obligation Yes: significantly higher Action 
Obligation in participants primed 
for intrinsic values.  
Yes: loss of British countryside elicited 
significantly lower Action Obligation than 
did climate change. 
 
Scope of Moral Duty Yes: less self-interested concern 
among participants primed for 
intrinsic values. 
Yes: loss of British countryside evoked 
lower reference to moral duties than did 
climate change, child mortality in 
developing countries, and child 
impoverishment in the UK. 
Immediacy No No 
Expressed Emotional 
Intensity 
No Yes: child mortality evoked significantly 
more emotion than did climate change or 
loss of British countryside. 
Table 2 – Results of preliminary analysis (analyst naive to priming condition). No 
significant interaction was found between topic and priming condition for any variable. 
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3.3. Post-manipulation value importance 
In past research, effects such as those reported above were found to occur 
independently of any change in a person’s values as a result of the priming 
process. Rather, it seems that such effects are attributable to the engagement 
of particular values as a result of the priming process. Collection of post-
interview data allowed us to examine whether this was the case in our study. We 
compared the results of our survey of participants’ values, using the second 
value survey - conducted after the interview.  
 
The only significant difference occurred for the value of Tradition. Here, 
participants primed with intrinsic values reported this value to be more 
descriptive of themselves than did participants in the extrinsic-prime condition. 
This unexpected difference does not appear to have any direct bearing on our 
principal findings.  
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4. Discussion of Phase 1 
4.1. Overview of findings 
This research led to an important result. We found that a simple procedure to 
prime intrinsic values (among an audience segment who attaches relatively 
greater importance to extrinsic values than does the UK population at large) 
leads these individuals to express significantly different frames than those 
expressed by individuals primed with extrinsic values, when both sets of 
individuals were talking about a range of social and environmental challenges.  
 
It is worth emphasising here that this result should not be taken to suggest that 
the values which individuals hold to be important at a more permanent, or 
‘dispositional’ level are easily malleable. The participants in this study all placed 
relatively high dispositional importance on extrinsic values. Such a value 
disposition would have arisen as a result of accumulated experience, probably 
over many years. Such experiences would be likely to include the way in which 
these individuals were parented and educated, their interactions with work 
colleagues and family, and their exposure to the media and advertising. Our 
procedure for priming either intrinsic or extrinsic values was not found to affect 
the dispositional importance these participants placed on particular values (see 
Section 3.3).12 It seems that the differences we identified between participants 
with intrinsic and extrinsic values arose as a result of ‘engaging’ existing values – 
i.e., of turning certain values ‘on’ in people’s minds, such that these values 
influenced how the participants conceived of the social and environmental 
challenges about which they were interviewed. Such a result therefore 
corroborates the perspective that, far from being able to neatly assign people to 
different values ‘modes’, people actually have the full range of values present in 
their motivational systems, and these values can be engaged as to influence later 
expressed attitudes. The important issue is which of these values are engaged at 
any particular time, as a result of an experience or message.  
 
                                                     
12 There was one exception to this, as discussed in Section 3.3: Participants’ rating of the 
importance of Tradition.  
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Significant differences, with priming condition, were found both in our computer 
analysis and discourse analysis, the latter being particularly revealing. 
  
In the case of the computer analysis, participants primed with extrinsic values 
used significantly fewer 1st person singular pronouns (I, me, my, mine, myself) 
than did participants primed with intrinsic values. This may at first appear 
counterintuitive, since it could be expected that extrinsic-primed individuals 
would make more reference to self. However, use of the first person singular 
need not reflect selfishness, as intrinsic values include those for self-
acceptance, and intrinsic values are associated with values of self-direction. It 
may have been that participants primed with intrinsic values are prompted to 
think more about themselves and their identities as they grappled with the social 
and environmental problems about which they were interviewed.  
 
Differences in the use of the 1st person plural pronouns (we, us, our, ours, 
ourselves) approached significance. It seems that the intrinsic value priming 
condition may have led participants to talk in ways that reflect higher relational 
content. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the engagement of 
other intrinsic values such as benevolence, affiliation, community and 
universalism.  
 
Explaining these differences has to be speculative. Maybe extrinsic-primed 
individuals use 1st person singular pronouns less frequently because they are 
less personally engaged or because they tend to objectify the world rather than 
see it in terms of personal relations (something that pronouns encode). Maybe 
they use fewer 1st person plural pronouns because they think less about group 
membership, whether that group is local community, national community or 
humanity in general. 
 
In the case of the initial analysis by the discourse analyst (who was at this stage 
naïve to the priming condition), we found differences across the priming 
conditions for three of the five variables examined. Compared to those primed 
with extrinsic values, participants primed with intrinsic values: spoke about 
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social and environmental challenges using more intrinsically-oriented than 
extrinsically-oriented language; suggested a greater obligation on the part of 
people to act in order to address the problem; and suggested a greater moral 
duty to address the problem.  That is, we found significant variation, with value 
prime, in Value Orientation, Action Obligation, and Moral Duty.  Not surprisingly, 
we did not find any effects of value prime on either the Expressed Emotion 
Intensity or Immediacy variables.  This is makes sense given that participants 
primed with extrinsic values might be anticipated to be as emotionally engaged 
by the issues about which they were interviewed as participants primed with 
intrinsic values, although the emotions might be rather different or differently 
expressed.  Similarly, participants primed with extrinsic values might feel that 
the topics about which they were being interviewed were quite immediate, even 
though that sense of immediacy may occur because of a sense that the problems 
impinge on their own lives (for example, expressing a sentiment that measures 
designed to help reduce climate change impinge on their freedoms to behave as 
they would like). 
 
4.2 Specific implications 
There are at least five possible implications these results, all of which are of 
importance to anyone working to build audience concern about bigger-than-self 
problems.   
 
Implication 1: Audiences oriented towards extrinsic values can be 
primed to express concerns consistent with intrinsic values 
 
Overall, the results demonstrate the relative ease with which individuals who 
prioritise extrinsic values can be primed in such a way that they talk about social 
and environmental problems using frames that embody intrinsic values. The 
assertion, made by some campaign consultants and communication agencies 
that it is futile to communicate with people who attach relatively greater 
importance to extrinsic values using frames that embody intrinsic values is not 
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supported by the results of this research. We reflect on possible approaches to 
priming intrinsic values in ‘real life’ communications in Section 6.  
 
Implication 2: Priming intrinsic values in audiences oriented toward 
extrinsic values leads to greater expression of concern about a range of 
social and environmental issues. 
 
This study offers further corroboration for the perspective that interventions 
which successfully engage intrinsic values are likely to lead to heightened 
expressions of concern about bigger-than-self problems. Other work has also 
demonstrated that the engagement of intrinsic values is associated with greater 
motivation to behave in ways consistent with this concern.13 The present study 
examined expressions of concern, rather than motivation to engage in pro-
environmental and pro-social behaviours. But we predict that an priming with 
intrinsic values will also lead to transient increases in such behaviour.  
 
Implication 3: It is not necessary to prime values specifically associated 
with particular social or environmental concerns in order to generate 
expressions of concern. Priming other intrinsic values elicits these 
expressions of concern.  
 
It is important to note that, during the priming process, we did not ask 
participants to reflect on intrinsic values that were directly related to social or 
environmental problems. ‘Acceptance’, ‘affiliation’ and ‘being broadminded’ are 
not, at first glance, directly related to concern for the environment or 
impoverished people in the UK or elsewhere. Yet, as predicted from an 
understanding of the dynamic way in which values interact with one another, it 
seems that there was ‘bleed-over’ such that participants for whom these values 
were primed were also more likely to express heightened concern about a range 
of issues closely related to the values ‘unity with nature’, ‘protecting the 
environment’, and ‘social justice’. Such results provide further evidence that any 
communicator – whatever the issues about which he or she is concerned – who 
                                                     
13 See op. cit. 1 for references. 
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primes intrinsic values in the course of interacting with his or her audience, is 
likely to increase this audience’s motivation to express concern about a range of 
social and environment issues, and to behave in line with that heightened 
concern. This is the premise upon which the Common Cause approach is built. 
There is already very extensive empirical evidence for this effect: this present 
study offers further corroboration.14  
 
This finding also points to the possible advantages of campaigns and 
communications that serve – explicitly or otherwise – to prompt an audience to 
reflect on the importance that they attach to intrinsic values.  There is an 
important opportunity here for creative communicators and campaigners to 
develop approaches that prompt such reflection.  
 
Implication 4: These results invite careful reflection on the criteria used 
in audience segmentation techniques 
 
These results raise questions about the optimal approaches to audience 
segmentation in designing social marketing interventions. Communicators and 
campaigners often segment their audiences, and engage different audience 
segments in different ways. Such segmentation might be conducted on the basis 
of socio-economic parameters, expressions of concern about environmental or 
social issues, or value surveys, for example.  
 
While we absolutely agree with the need to tailor a message to the intended 
audience, we have been highly critical of approaches which, following value 
surveys, have appealed to those audience segments who place greater relative 
importance on extrinsic values by framing communications and campaigns to 
appeal to extrinsic values.15  As we have seen, the present study corroborates 
our case that campaigners and communicators should seek to avoid use of 
frames which are likely to engage extrinsic values. 
 
                                                     
14 See op. cit. 1 for references. 
15 Kasser & Crompton (2011). 
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However, what we do not yet know is whether, when primed with intrinsic 
values, audience segments who place greater relative importance on intrinsic 
values will respond similarly to the participants in this study who were drawn 
from audience segments who place greater relative importance on extrinsic 
values.  
 
It may be that particular communications and campaigns which serve to prime 
intrinsic values and communicate using intrinsic-frames, will be effective 
irrespective of the relative importance an audience places on extrinsic or intrinsic 
values.  If this is the case, it may be that other criteria, besides values 
orientation, come to be seen as of primary importance for the purposes of 
audience segmentation exercises. For example, issues of national identity, 
regional language differences, educational attainment, or shared interests may 
provide a more relevant basis for choosing between possible intrinsic-frames to 
use in a particular campaign than values orientation. 
 
Alternatively, it may be that communicators and campaigners should use 
different frames in communicating with audience segments that place greater 
relative importance on intrinsic values as opposed to extrinsic values – even 
though, in both instances, the frames that they deploy should be shaped to 
engage intrinsic values. Further work is needed here.  
 
So while we would advocate framing communications and campaigns in terms of 
intrinsic values irrespective of the targeted audience segment, it is very 
important to emphasise that this does not imply that we advocate a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ approach to communication. There will be a range of ways of framing a 
campaign or communication through appeal to intrinsic values. The specific 
frames used will doubtless need to be carefully crafted, based upon an 
understanding of the primary audience. There is huge opportunity here for the 
involvement of organizations with expertise in audience segmentation and 
creative communications.  
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Implication 5: These results probably provide insights on what frames 
are likely to engage intrinsic values. 
 
We assume that the frames which participants expressed in the interviews 
reflect how these participants understand each of the interview topics when 
particular values are active in their minds. Significant differences in the frames 
used, varying with priming condition, can probably be taken to reveal frames that 
are associated with either extrinsic or intrinsic values, respectively. 
 
Frames, however, are used not just to express what is understood, but also to 
understand what is expressed. This is because of the nature of communication – 
in order to communicate something a speaker must anticipate what a hearer is 
likely to understand, i.e. which common frames speaker and hearer are likely to 
share. In light of this, presenting these participants with the frames that they 
consistently use when primed with intrinsic values holds promise for engaging 
these values.  
 
It seems likely, therefore, that frames which are apparent in the transcripts of 
interviews with participants primed with intrinsic values (especially those 
frames which are also found to be absent or weak in transcripts from interviews 
with participants primed with extrinsic values) will be of particular help in 
engaging intrinsic values in other comparable audiences.  
 
We have raised the possibility of designing communications and campaigns to 
prompt an audience to reflect on the importance that they attach to intrinsic 
values. Now we can also begin to see how the results of this research point to 
frames which, while more passively received, may nonetheless help to engage 
intrinsic values.  
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5. Results of Phase 2 
5.1. Overview 
As discussed in Section 1, we had set ourselves the question: ‘Can we 
demonstrate the possibility of engaging intrinsic values among audiences who 
attach relatively high importance to extrinsic values, such that the engagement 
of these values is recognisable when these people are subsequently asked to talk 
about bigger-than-self problems such as climate change or child mortality in 
developing countries’?  
 
The results of Phase 1 of this study answered ‘yes’ to this question.  
 
We also posed a second question, raised above in Implication 5: ‘Can we begin to 
identify particular cognitive frames that audiences who attach relatively high 
importance to extrinsic values themselves use, in talking about bigger-than-self 
problems, when they have undergone a process to engage intrinsic values?’ 
Although we began to address this question in Phase 1 of this study, we wanted 
to conduct more detailed analysis to provide a fuller picture of what frames 
were used by participants from the group primed with intrinsic values, but which 
were rarely, if ever, used by participants from the group primed with extrinsic 
values. Phase 2 of this study comprised this more detailed analysis – now on a 
subset of the interview transcripts. As discussed in Section 3.2, for this phase we 
chose seven participants from the group primed with intrinsic values, and seven 
from the group primed with extrinsic values. Our discourse analyst was no longer 
naive to the priming condition in this second phase. Further, we limited this 
second phase of the study to only fourteen participants, given the time-intensive 
nature of this analysis. Full details of this analysis are under preparation, for 
separate publication. 
 
The discourse analyst compiled a long list of frames where, in his judgment, 
there were clear differences associated with priming condition – either across 
topics, or within particular topics. Many of these were frames that were 
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apparent in transcripts of interviews with the participants primed with intrinsic 
values, but not in those of the participants primed with extrinsic values. These 
frames are of particular interest because there are theoretical reasons for 
arguing that use of these frames is likely to engage intrinsic values among other, 
comparable, audience segments. Some other frames were identified in 
transcripts of interviews with participants primed with extrinsic values, but 
rarely, if ever, in participants primed wit intrinsic values. These are important 
frames to identify because there is a strong theoretical argument for 
communicators and campaigners to avoid these frames, which are likely to serve 
to engage extrinsic values.  
 
Table 3 summarises a subset of the frames that were identified, along with a 
subjective assessment of the relative frequency of these frames in the 
transcripts of interviews with the two groups of 7 participants.16 In the 
remainder of this section, we present some specific examples of text transcribed 
from the interviews in order to illustrate some of these differences in frames. It 
must be remembered that quantifying the occurrence of specific frames, though 
not impossible, is extremely difficult to do, so the remarks in the table are 
impressionistic. Nonetheless, they are based on very careful scrutiny and 
detailed familiarity with what the participants discussed in the transcripts.  
 
   
                                                     
16 At this stage, the analyst, Paul Chilton, was actually looking beyond frames. He also 
identified other ‘cognitive strategies’ reflected in language use. This included, for 
example, a tendency for speakers to shift their viewpoint from themselves (‘I’) to that 
of somebody else distant from them in place, time or social space. This might be 
indicated by use of ‘we’ or by invocation of hypothetical alternative ‘worlds’ (e.g. by 
using ‘if’).   
39 
Frames noted in the 
analyses Priming condition 
 INTRINSIC EXTRINSIC 
Frames present in transcripts of interviews with intrinsically-primed 
participants, but weak or absent in transcripts of interviews with  
extrinsically-primed participants 
Moral frame present weakly present, fewer and 
different frames; less 
reflection 
Intrinsic value of nature frame present not present 
Equality and justice strongly present in some 
participants 
weakly present 
Children frame: care and special 
consideration 
present not present 
Compassion emotions/principle present not present 
Waste-not-want-not present not present 
Guilty conscience present one resistant mention 
Value of human life principle present not present 
Responsibility for others principle present not present 
Environmentalist  present occasional 
Climate change science frames: 
causation, effects, cycles 
Interviewees professed lack of 
scientific knowledge 
some interviewees claim 
scientific authority 
Helping frames numerous generated by interview 
questions 
not numerous; sometimes 
speaker counters or represses 
them 
Poverty’s not necessary:  there’s 
enough to go round 
present not present 
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 INTRINSIC EXTRINSIC 
Frames present in transcripts of interviews with participants primed 
with extrinsic values, but weak or absent in transcripts of interviews 
with participants primed with intrinsic values 
Doesn’t affect me directly occasional present 
Phenomenon doesn’t exist (e.g. climate 
change) or isn’t serious (e.g. child 
mortality in developing countries) 
not present present 
Self-interest sometimes implicit: saving money  strong and more varied: saving 
money, personal security 
Proximity and distance framing proximity bias countered by some  proximity bias strong 
Financial and commercial frames occasional  but sometimes 
questioned. 
strongly present 
Group pressure and approval occasional strongly present 
   
 INTRINSIC EXTRINSIC 
Other 
Social identity frames present:  sometimes used in 
favour of helping stance 
present: used to dissociate self 
from topic 
Who does ‘we’ refer to? we used to mean ‘we humans’ as 
well as ‘we in the UK/developed 
countries’ 
we meaning ‘we humans’ not 
noticed. 
Scientism (authoritarian, exaggerated) not noticed authority used to ground 
scepticism  
Mixed frames and frame switching multiple frames; some evidence 
of cognitive dissonance, value 
conflict and change 
occasional; narrower range of 
frames, less evidence of  frame 
switching and adopting of 
other-oriented perspectives 
Charity begins at home, this country 
first 
present ‘this country’s economy first’ 
version more prevalent 
Table 3: Some results of further qualitative analysis on interview transcripts 
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It can be seen that some of the frames listed in Table 3 reoccur regardless of 
which of the four topics were under discussion. Others are topic specific. We 
would predict that such topic-specific frames will be of less general help in 
prompting an audience to use frames that embody the values used in the priming 
condition. However, this has yet to be tested. 
5.2. Discussion of specific frames and their possible implications 
In the following sub-sections, we examine just two examples of the key frames 
identified in Table 3 (themselves a subset of the total set of frames that we 
identified). As will be seen, this analysis is very detailed—reflecting the genuine 
complexities involved in the kind of ‘thinking aloud’ that occurs in this type of 
interactive interview. 
 
These two examples serve to illustrate our approach to examining the ways in 
which frames and values appear, are modified, doubted, or mixed up in what 
people are actually saying. Parts of the transcript that are of particular 
relevance to the analysis are underlined.  
 
5.2.1 Example 1: Moral frames 
 
Participant 003 (intrinsic prime) reflects on child mortality in developing 
countries, and provides an example of how deontic words (words conveying duty 
or moral responsibility) raise a wider frame, here economic justice: 
 
(003) umm and I think it’s really unfair the injustice of 
how some people have loads and other people have 
absolutely nothing and yeah it’s terrible 
 
Recall that this person, in common with the other participants, was selected 
because of the high importance that she placed on intrinsic values relative to the 
population at large. But Participant 003 is among those whose intrinsic values 
had been engaged in her mind by means of a prime. The discourse analyst’s 
overall impression was that participants primed with extrinsic values did not 
evoke this frame so clearly, or use it as often, as participants primed with 
intrinsic values.  
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For example, participant 016 (extrinsic prime) presupposes the frame of 
economic justice and natural balance when talking about the historical 
distribution of UK land, but he does not use these frames for any of the other 
topics, or to develop a standpoint. That is, this particular person, primed with 
extrinsic values does not generalize the other-oriented frame to climate change 
effects, the occurrence of poverty in the UK or to child mortality in developing 
countries. In fact, in regard to the latter, he markedly dismisses child mortality 
as a kind of natural occurrence and asserts “there is a moral onus on us … not to 
provide these things [medicine and nutrition] because I believe that charity 
begins at home”. It seems that extrinsically-oriented frames are more strongly 
expressed in the participants primed with extrinsic values, and moreover that, 
among these participants, such frames are more likely to ‘bleed-over’ across 
topics.  
  
Consider Participant 021 (intrinsic prime), reflecting on the topic child 
impoverishment in the UK. Here this participant makes an assertion that x should 
do y. In the context, such an assertion makes sense only if a moral stance based 
on some notion of economic fairness is understood to be in the background of her 
mind. Like Participant 003, this speaker uses a ‘have, have not’ formulation, 
which again takes it for granted that such a state of affairs is unacceptable. 
 
(021) I think they should stop I mean bonuses and the 
bankers and it’s publicised on the news for 
goodness sake, it’s back to the haves and the have 
nots 
 
Participant 003, at least when prompted by the interviewer, also spells out a 
frame concerning moral obligation: 
 
(003) Interviewer: Ultimately, where do you think um 
responsibility for this problem lies? 
Interviewee: … umm with every individual in the 
world like to look after yourself but then to look 
after others how you’d like to be treated as well  
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… yeah  I  think predominantly  I  think it should 
with governments but then everybody has their own  
responsibility  to do something and like be aware 
of the world that they live in but like be aware of 
the problems and do what they can to help.  
 
There are several frames and values here: The overarching one is both 
universalist and individualist: it is individuals who have prime responsibility but, 
in this person’s stated perspective, this responsibility is a universal one binding on 
each individual. The way the speaker elaborates on this is of some interest. It is 
clear that a focus on self does not in itself exclude an altruistic value-orientation 
that has universalist moral force.  
 
At the same time, Participant 003 has a model of governance that attributes 
responsibility to governments (and here the speaker seems to mean 
governments in developed countries). It might seem that she is shifting 
responsibility away from self onto government. Some speakers blame the 
governments of developing countries in this, but this does not seem to be 
happening here. In fact her attitude towards governance in particular is in 
contrast with the kind of self-interested individualism that resists giving 
regulatory and other powers to government. 
 
Compare these to frames used by participants primed for extrinsic values. Asked 
about child mortality in developing countries, Participant 009 (extrinsic prime) 
says: 
 
009 Interviewer  OK and lastly then how does this topic 
make you feel emotionally-speaking? 
Interviewee  er it’s not something I think about 
that often, er to tell the truth I am more concerned 
with domestic issues 
 
And Participant 010 (extrinsic prime):  
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010 I don’t really feel much for it, you know, in a lot 
of ways it is … it’s a part of life over there … 
it’s the way of life, that’s what happens so it’s 
nothing to get too upset about.  
 
All participants, of course, will have compassion value frames in their minds. 
That is, they know about compassion, even if they do not engage values of 
compassion in their thinking and behaviour at that moment. In the group of 7 
participants primed for extrinsic values, there is one, Participant 020 (extrinsic 
prime), who gives clear evidence of this. She is reminded of the ‘caring’ frame by 
the question, declares she is not caring and, as it were, holds up the frame 
ironically in order to discount it.17 This comes after similar unemotional 
responses to the preceding topics of climate change and loss of the British 
countryside:  
 
020 … I don’t seem to [really] be caring about any of 
these things this is really bad I feel like I should  
“now be caring” 
Interviewer: [laughs] 
Interviewee: I feel like I should care but.. 
 
 
What seems to be happening here with this person, primed with extrinsic values, 
is that the ‘caring’ frame is available, comes to consciousness, but is then 
dismissed verbally. It seems possible that, had this participant undergone an 
intrinsic-prime, her ‘thinking aloud’ would have led in the opposite direction. 
People’s openness to developing their thought and frames, on the basis of what 
seem to be pre-existing moral frames, should be given careful consideration in 
designing campaigns and communications. Recall that all participants were 
selected as attaching greater than average importance to extrinsic values. But 
the evidence of their discourse suggests that they are not rigidly fixed in this 
value-orientation. They all, but particularly the subjects primed with intrinsic 
values, seem readily able to access deontic (i.e. moral values based) discourse. It 
                                                     
17 She does this by intonation.   
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may be that extrinsically-oriented people are more likely to adopt a moral frame 
when primed with intrinsic values.  
 
5.2.2 Example 2: Financial and commercial frames 
 
Our discourse analysis suggests that the group primed with extrinsic values 
gives more attention to economic and financial concerns. For example, 
Participant 009 (extrinsic prime), when asked about climate change, responds: 
 
009 well firstly there’s the quality of life er side of 
things so obviously if you’re breathing in polluted 
air then you won’t necessarily live as long. Er 
there’s the er financial reasons for it as well. I 
mean if we’re … mining everything to you know 
purely for profit and trade and everything like 
that eventually there’ll be none left and there’s 
the whole boom and bust scenario which can bring 
along depressions and such and I think those are 
the two biggest reasons.  
 
This response focuses on one detail that affects human life but quickly moves to 
financial reasons. Although the participant does mention overexploitation of 
resources, this is not per se linked to climate change, and he focuses on financial 
concerns. By contrast, while financial frames are occasionally present in the 
group primed with intrinsic values, they do not seem to be used as extensively as 
a means of countering or suppressing moral frames and helping frames.  
 
Participant 007 (extrinsic prime) foregrounds financial savings as a motive for 
taking individual action regarding climate change, and explicitly excludes action 
based on principle or obligation: 
 
007 usage I do tend to switch things off but that’s 
more a case of me saving money in electricity than 
thinking oh that’s gonna help the world. 
 […] 
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electricity use car usage and things like that 
most of it comes down to money for friends and 
family you think oh I won’t do that cos it’s 
cheaper to do it the other way. 
 
Similarly Participant 020 (extrinsic prime): 
 
020 all the basic stuff like turning lights off 
recycling uh saving water all that kind of thing 
but then at the same time like turning lights off 
and saving water and stuff also saves on my bills 
so it’s kind of in my interest to do it as well? so 
if you think about it there’s actually 
[unintelligible] like this but there’s actually 
kind of a financial reward for you kind of saving 
the planet? if you look at it like that? because 
you save money and are kind of saving the planet at 
the same time  
 
It should follow logically that financial penalty, rather than moral obligation, is 
likely to be anticipated to affect behaviour. And this does seem to be the case for 
Participant 007 (extrinsic prime): 
 
007    Mm, what would motivate me? I suppose money if there 
was a financial incentive to be more proactive...  
 
Similar frames are deployed by participants primed with extrinsic values, in 
talking about child mortality in developing countries. For example, Participant 
007 (extrinsic prime) again: 
 
007 … again it’s a selfish point of view isn’t it. 
You’ve got to look at it. I want our Government to 
get our country back on its feet before they decide 
to plough money into helping … developing countries. 
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The analysis suggests that this saving-money frame is different from a ‘waste-
not-want-not’ frame identified in the group primed with intrinsic values. The 
latter seems to emanate from principles that have moral force acquired from a 
particular social milieu/generation. Participant 021 (intrinsic prime) is notable in 
this respect: 
 
021 I think that most human beings quite selfish and 
lazy, aaand they take for granted what they have if 
you were in another country you’d be more aware of, 
not having the wealth that you have possibly in the 
UK. So you wouldn’t necessarily buy things and throw 
them away and this kind of thing, I was brought up 
in a poor home up the valleys and my mother wouldn’t 
waste anything, so I guess that’s been instilled in 
me a bit, erm I’m a little bit more free than she 
was because I haven’t got the same level of poverty, 
thank God, but erm, I ’m still, you know I don’t 
like to waste food, don’t like to throw things away, 
don’t like excess packaging, urm regarding the earth 
I think, mankind is destroying his own environment 
and er, I think there are a lot more people now that 
are aware of that and more conscientious about it. 
 
It should not be forgotten that this individual, primed with intrinsic values, came 
to the interview as someone than with an above-average extrinsic orientation 
compared to the UK population. Clearly, there are specific demographic 
characteristics involved and, as suggested earlier, consideration needs to be 
given to this in designing campaign appeals. 
 
Returning to the point that people primed with extrinsic values seem to veer 
toward the saving-money frame, we should nonetheless note that one 
participant in the subset of 7 participants primed with extrinsic values does take 
reduction of carbon footprint seriously, and this seems to have nothing to do with 
the sort of financial incentives that Participant 007 (extrinsic prime) invoked. 
Participant 010 (extrinsic prime):  
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010 It’s … it’s quite a wide ranging thing isn’t it 
carbon footprint. There’s quite a lot you can do, 
you know. I am fairly conscious of switching off 
electric items when not in use and and, you know, 
keeping energy usage to a minimum and trying to 
keep my carbon footprint down. 
 
Unlike Participant 007 (extrinsic prime) and others in this group of participants 
primed with extrinsic values, participant 010 (extrinsic prime) thinks “Definitely 
it’s always down to the individual”. But this does not seem a dominant way of 
thinking in this group. 
 
Frames of money-saving and finance are often used in attempting to motivate 
low-carbon behaviours. Clearly, we have to be cautious in drawing firm 
conclusions from this small pool of data, but these results seem to suggest that 
an extrinsic prime increases the frequency of use of such frames. This is 
consistent with our suggestion elsewhere that these frames are likely to engage 
extrinsic values, and therefore erode wider concern about environmental and 
social problems.18  
  
 
                                                     
18 Crompton (2010); Kasser & Crompton (2011) 
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6. Looking ahead 
 
This experiment has produced important results, but these are based on a small 
sample of interviews (in the case of Phase 2, just fourteen). While the results are 
largely in line with theoretical predictions, more work is clearly needed to 
substantiate these. Nonetheless, these results challenge universal 
generalizations asserted by some campaign strategists. They challenge, for 
example, the assertion that it is futile to address intrinsic values when targeting 
audiences who attach relatively higher importance to extrinsic values.  
 
But, aside from the results we have generated, we believe that this experiment 
serves another important purpose. It demonstrates an approach to audience 
research which moves beyond the passive approach of most social marketing 
strategies – of simply exploring individuals’ needs and expectations, without 
asking either: (i) what values are brought to the fore at the time of the audience 
segmentation exercise; or (ii) what values could communications designed as a 
result of this segmentation usefully strive to strengthen?  
 
We see real opportunities here for those audience researchers who are working 
for organisations that are concerned to help motivate responses to bigger-than-
self problems, to begin to integrate an understanding of the ways in which 
intrinsic values are primed across audience segments. 
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